Why Amorim's system isn't working - tactical analysis

Manchester United's dismal loss to League Two side Grimsby Town in the Carabao Cup in midweek was the latest low for the club under Ruben Amorim.

During the Portuguese's tenure, United have consistently found it difficult to turn his gameplan into success on the pitch.

They've spent £200m on new signings this summer and have been shipping out players deemed surplus to requirements.

The focus now is getting it right with the squad they have, or at least being able to finish far higher than last season, when they were 15th.

Here we analyse Amorim's system and explore possible reasons why it has been largely unsuccessful so far. We focus on issues both on and off the ball, with examples of how teams typically exploit them.

Amorim's philosophy explained

Amorim plays a positional 5-2-3 system, asking players to stick to rigid zones. His wing-back stays wide. His central midfield stays central. There are minimal rotations within his team.

In this system, Amorim aims to get the better of opponents by using overloads across the pitch.

He attempts to create areas on the pitch in which his team have more players than the opponents, such as the flanks.

In theory, having the extra man makes getting up the pitch into dangerous areas easier.

Positionally, he looks to do this in wide areas using the wing-back, number 10, central midfielder and centre-back.

Why United struggled against Grimsby's man-to-man press

A tactic that negates numerical overloads is man-to-man marking across the pitch - and it is one Grimsby employed.

When this happens, United and their opponents have the same number of players in each area of the pitch, so a Plan B is required.

To get out of situations in which you are marked man to man, teams require players with dribbling quality. By holding off your marker and dribbling past them, the opponents' press is disrupted and spaces open up.

We saw this in United's first goal against Grimsby with Kobbie Mainoo. By beating his marker in a duel and carrying the ball upfield, his individual quality pulled apart Grimsby's defensive shape, and Bryan Mbeumo was able to score.

A second method by which a man-to-man press is beaten is by players roaming across the pitch - dragging their opponents into awkward areas before playing quick passes around them.

With both options, the idea is for one of your players to get the better of the individual tasked with marking them, which disrupts the opponents' press.

But Amorim's tactics don't often allow for this against man-to-man pressure.

By playing in a rigid positional manner, players don't roam, so don't drag the opposition into unfamiliar areas. Opponents can therefore press United players in their respective zones in a predictable manner.

Amorim's system also doesn't encourage players taking numerous touches and dribbling freely to beat their opponents.

This may sound confusing, but the Portuguese instead appears to instruct his team to enact specific passing patterns, which we will analyse next.

Ultimately, Amorim wants his team to play with fewer touches, carrying out his pre-planned passing routines.

In his system, there is less room for individual expression and problem-solving.

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Amorim's predictable passing routines

What we have established is Amorim plays a positional style of football that looks to better opponents through overloads rather than individuals beating their man.

The way they look to do this is through specific passing routines.

United build with three at the back. These defenders look to play a straight pass into the feet of attackers, who look to lay it off to a team-mate - often a central midfielder - who then looks for a through ball over the top.

In the coaching world, this is sometimes referred to as an 'up-back-through', referencing the pass up the pitch, the pass backwards, then the through ball.

The reason for the direct pass up to the attacker is to entice the opposition centre-back to follow the attacker, which could open up space for a United player to run into. The player in behind could then play a cross for team-mates arriving in the box.

United captain Bruno Fernandes has been criticised for playing long passes rather than taking more touches, but it is likely this is under instruction, with Amorim wanting to free either the attacker or wing-back running in behind.

With these schemes based on playing with fewer touches, players who have a tendency to take more - or play centrally - such as Mainoo, are less natural fits.

How teams nullify United's passing routines

When you watch United on the ball, it becomes apparent how frequently this passing routine is attempted down the sides.

Teams can try to stop it by defending in a back five.

By setting up in a formation that mirrors United's attacking shape, the opposition centre-back and wing-back match up to their number 10 and wing-back.

United's passing routine is less effective when the situations it results in are two against two, rather than two against one.

By pairing a back-five defensive shape with man-to-man pressure, United's main way of getting up the pitch into dangerous areas becomes less effective.

Knowing United focus heavily down the wide areas, Grimsby angled their press in a unique manner, ignoring the centre of the pitch at times.

That allowed them to focus efforts on preventing United from executing their passing routines effectively.

United's defensive shape explained

In analysing Amorim's United, it is key to assess how they intend to defend during longer periods without the ball.

Bar the occasional 5-4-1, United play in a 5-2-3 that aims to push high up the pitch, attempting to win the ball back. If this initial pressure is unsuccessful, they drop into a more compact shape in the middle before retreating to their own third.

Although United attempt to apply pressure with the aim of winning the ball back high up, they don't opt for man-to-man pressure across the pitch.

They often have an extra player in their defensive line, sometimes two. This helps them defend against strikers directly but also means opponents usually have one or two free men elsewhere, often in midfield.

Rather than pressing man to man, United attempt to press based on certain triggers. The wide central defenders (most recently Leny Yoro and Luke Shaw) are asked to follow opponents into midfield when the ball is on their side of the pitch, and their respective attackers drop deep.

When teams move the ball wide, United converge looking to trap opponents.

Knowing how they want to defend helps explain why it doesn't always work.

How United's press is bypassed

United's 5-2-3 shape, when in the opposition's third, can be exploited through clever movements with the intention of getting an extra body deeper. Essentially, opponents overload United's front three by playing with four players deeper.

At times, a central midfielder is seen dropping deep, and a team's back three becomes a back four. United's narrow attacking three struggle to contain the extra player, and passing around them becomes easier.

Teams often prevent United's wing-back from pressing high and helping the front three by putting a player on the touchline, essentially 'pinning' them back.

Opponents overload United's two-man midfield

The pinning-back of United's wing-backs has a secondary benefit.

With only two midfielders in the centre of the pitch, United can be outnumbered through smart movement opponents have begun to make more frequently.

Fulham boss Marco Silva's tactics illustrate this clearly. Ryan Sessegnon - a full-back - pushed up the pitch to pin Amad Diallo back. Alex Iwobi then left his wing position to move into a central area.

With Iwobi joining Fulham's two central midfielders, Fernandes and Casemiro were outnumbered. Josh King dropped from attack to become a fourth man at times.

Once the initial pressure of United's front three is bypassed and teams get higher up the pitch, these overloads in midfield allow opponents to establish their dominance on the game, keeping more of the ball for long periods.

What next?

Sporting were largely successful under Amorim, and United's decision to hire him will have been based on their dominance.

The 40-year-old clearly has an unrelenting belief in his coaching methodology and principles at this early stage of his career.

With the right players whose quality is far above that of their opponents - like at Sporting - Amorim's system could work.

But the standard of the Premier League is higher, so creating such an advantage during recruitment is a greater challenge.

And with the transfer window drawing to a close, Amorim may need to adapt his chosen game model to secure results in the short term.